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ABSTRACT: In 2017, the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) was criticized for two controversial 
directives that restricted the eligibility of academic scientists to serve on the agency’s key science 
advisory boards (SABs). The EPA portrayed these directives as necessary to ensure the integrity of the 
SAB. Critics portrayed them as a tactic by the agency to advance a more industry-friendly 
deregulatory agenda. With this backdrop, this research examined board composition and its effect on 
the perceived legitimacy of risk management recommendations by the SAB. In an experiment, we 
presented participants with hypothetical EPA SABs composed of different proportions of academic 
and industry scientists. We then asked participants to rate their satisfaction with, and the legitimacy 
of, these boards in light of their decisions in scenarios based on actual EPA SAB deliberations. 
Participants perceived higher levels of satisfaction and legitimacy when SABs made more stringent 
risk management recommendations. While SABs dominated by industry scientists were perceived to 
be more strongly motivated to protect business interests, we found no effect of board composition 
on perceptions of satisfaction and legitimacy. These results are consistent with prior research on 
decision quality that suggests people use normative outcomes as a heuristic for assessing the quality 
of deliberations. Moreover, these results suggest that members of the public are supportive of federal 
science advisory boards regardless of their composition, but only if they take actions that are 
consistent with normative expectations. 
Keywords: procedural justice, EPA, legitimacy, risk management, decision-making 
Acknowledgements: This research was supported by the U.S. National Science Foundation under 
award number SES 1728807 to Decision Research and the University of Michigan. The authors are 
grateful to Christopher Zarba for his assistance during the design of this research. Thanks also to three 














Federal advisory boards offer guidance to policy-makers about pre-existing or proposed policies. Of 
the 1,004 advisory boards assembled under Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) in 2018, 220 
were designated as “scientific and technical” (General Services Administration 2019). Scientists who 
serve on these federal science advisory boards (SABs) are considered to be experts in their field, and 
they are subject to external review and comment during their selection as a way of confirming their 
standing. Membership on federal SABs is often drawn from the community of scientists working in 
academia. However, scientists from industry (and industry trade associations), private consulting, 
tribal and state agencies, and the non-profit sector may also be invited to serve. Service on a SAB 
represents one of the few formal channels through which non-governmental scientists may formally 
participate in the policy-making process (Stuessy 2016).  
Far from a proverbial feather in the cap of non-governmental scientists, service on a federal SAB 
serves an important, practical purpose. These scientists help government agencies to identify relevant 
studies in the early stages of problem identification and policy formulation, they offer guidance on 
best practices—in research design, data collection, and analysis—across a wide spectrum of scientific 
disciplines, and they help to set expectations about the ethical and scientific norms (e.g., regarding 
replication and data transparency) that underlie the conduct and use of science for policy-making. In 
effect, a federal SAB serves a critical peer review role for the science underlying policy (Wagner et al. 
2018). 
A high-profile example of a federal SAB is the Chartered Science Advisory Board assembled by the 
United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). The EPA SAB was created in 1978 and 
works under a congressional mandate codified under section 8(b) of the Environmental Research, 
Development, and Demonstration Authorization Act (ERDDAA). Its objective is to provide 
independent advice and peer review to the EPA Administrator on scientific and technical matters that 
are relevant to agency rulemaking. While the SAB reports to the EPA Administrator, congressional 
committees may also ask for guidance from the SAB on scientific and technical matters (95th 
Congress of the United States of America 1978).  
Under the Trump administration, the EPA SAB has come under public and political scrutiny because 
of a directive
1
 issued by former EPA Administer, Scott Pruitt, and upheld by the agency’s current 
                                                          
1Administrator Pruitt’s directive, dated 31 October 2017, was entitled Strengthening and Improving Membership on EPA 
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Administrator, Andrew Wheeler. This directive (henceforth referred to as the “Pruitt directive”) 
introduced more restrictive rules governing the eligibility of academic scientists to serve on the EPA 
SAB
2
 by barring those who received research grant support from the EPA from serving on the SAB. 
These rules did not restrict the service on SABs of scientists from EPA-regulated industry, or from 
state agencies that receive EPA funds. A second directive, building directly on the first, prematurely 
terminated the appointments of several EPA SAB members. 
The Pruitt directive was framed by the EPA as necessary for ensuring the independence, diversity, and 
integrity of EPA science committees.  However, critics portrayed the directive as a tactic by the 
agency to advance a deregulatory policy agenda—and to suppress mainstream science—by increasing 
the influence of scientists employed by industries (and their trade associations) that are regulated by 
the EPA, and state agencies known for a right-of-center political stance on environmental and public 
health risks (Cornwall 2017, Union of Concerned Scientists 2018)
3
.  
That in today’s political climate a conservative leaning EPA leadership and a largely liberal leaning 
block of academic scientists (Nisbet 2011) and their supporters disagree about the intent behind the 
Pruitt directive is not surprising.  However, an open question remains as to whether members of the 
American public (to whom the agencies like EPA ultimately answer) would nevertheless be satisfied 
with the work being done by SABs—importantly, view the work as legitimate—given these changes.  
Public polling data offers conflicting answers to these questions. Even though public trust in the 
scientific community has remained both high and stable since the 1970s (Pew Research Center 2019), 
recent research has demonstrated that industry scientists are viewed with greater skepticism by 
members of the public than are academic scientists (Besley et al. 2017). This result points to the 
possibility of dampened public support for the EPA’s current stance on the composition of its SAB. 
At the same time, however, other polls reveal a significant partisan divide between members of the 
public regarding their concern about safeguarding the environment as a priority for policy. Less one-
third (31%) of Republicans think the environment should be a top priority for policy-makers; this 
                                                          
2This same directive affected the eligibility of academic scientists to serve on the EPA’s Clean Air Scientific Advisory 
Committee (CASAC) and the EPA’s Board of Scientific Councillors (which is managed by the EPA Office of Research and 
Development). 
3For example, the proportion of EPA SAB members representing industry rose from 5% in 2008 to 11% in 2016; this period 
of time reflected EPA leadership under Presidents George W. Bush (2001 – 2008) and Barack Obama (2009 – 2016). The 
proportion of EPA SAB members representing industry then jumped from 11% in 2017 to 34% in 2019, reflecting the first 
three years of the Trump administration. In this same period (2017 – 2019), representation on the EPA SAB by academic 
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number jumps to 74% for Democrats. But, the partisan divide on the public’s highest public policy 
priority is considerably smaller: a majority of both Republicans (79%) and Democrats (64%) view the 
economy as the most important issue facing policy makers (Pew Research Center 2019). It is 
reasonable to assume, therefore, that industry scientists may be perceived as placing greater emphasis 
on economic priorities given their affiliation with companies even if it means sacrificing some degree 
of environmental protection in the process. In turn, these data on public perceptions of policy 
priorities points to the possibility of broader public support for the EPA’s reorganization of its SAB to 
include more scientists representing the business interests of private industry.  
From a theoretical perspective, the group value model of procedural justice offers some insights about 
how the Pruitt directive to alter the balance of its SAB would be viewed by members of the American 
public. Prior research points to a positive relationship between the perceived acceptability and 
legitimacy of regulatory decision-making processes, and the degree to which observers of (e.g., Arvai 
2003)—or participants in (e.g., Arvai et al. 2001)—the decision-making process judge it to be fair and 
unbiased (see also Colquitt 2001, Phillips 2002). The underlying mechanism of this relationship is 
thought to be linked to certain signals being sent by the process itself; the process in which regulatory 
decisions are made communicates symbolic information to observers about whether the decision-
makers themselves have the appropriate standing or expertise, and whether they are impartial and 
trustworthy (Lind and Tyler 1988, McComas et al. 2007). 
Applying this group value model of procedural justice to the Pruitt directive, it is conceivable that the 
scientists serving on it would be viewed by outside observers as having the appropriate standing or 
expertise. (As we note above, scientists who serve on SABs must be verifiable experts in their field; 
e.g., according to the EPA SAB’s own charter, its members must be scientific experts who, together, 
can assess the scientific and technical aspects of environmental issues facing the agency). However, it 
is equally conceivable that scientists working for industry may be perceived as lacking in impartiality 
because of their relationship with their industry employers.  
Specifically, the relationship between these scientists and their employers—many of which represent 
industries that fall under the regulatory scrutiny of the EPA
4
—may be seen by outside observers as 
causing them to think and act in the interests of their employers, and not necessarily in the interests of 
                                                          
4At the time this research was conducted, the employers of scientists serving on the EPA SAB included chemical companies 
(e.g., Dow), consumer products manufacturers (e.g., Procter and Gamble), industry lobby associations (the American 
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the environment or the American public. Indeed, outside perceptions of a lack of impartiality amongst 
industry scientists may be the mechanism behind the observation (Besley et al. 2017) that they tend to 
be viewed with greater skepticism when compared with academic scientists. In support of this 
assertion, other research has suggested that perceptions about the presence (or absence) of conflict of 
interest may be used by observers as a heuristic for more negatively judging the legitimacy of a 
process, or their satisfaction with the outcomes that result from it (Thibaut and Walker 1975, 
McComas et al. 2007). 
An alternative theoretical perspective on the question of public support for the Pruitt directive comes 
from research on judgment and decision-making. It is generally accepted by decision-scientists that 
the quality of a decision is best measured by the process used to arrive at it. Beyond the symbolic 
information conveyed by a deliberative process, a well-structured decision-making process works to 
clarify and define the problem (or opportunity) that is to be the focus of analysis; identify objectives 
(and associated performance measures) from stakeholders and relevant experts; develop alternatives 
that are responsive to these objectives and then forecast their performance; and systematically 
confront the tradeoffs that arise when objectives and alternatives inevitably conflict (Keeney and 
Raiffa 1993, Gregory et al. 2012, Campbell-Arvai et al. 2018). These are the components of decision-
making that fall under the direct control of decision-makers (whether or not the outcomes of these 
processes actually unfold as predicted—or hoped—often does not), hence their importance in 
evaluating decision quality.  
However, from the standpoint of outside observers, including those affected by decisions, positive (or 
normative) outcomes tend to be more highly valued than process in evaluations of decision quality 
(Baron and Hershey 1988, Lipshitz and Barak 1995, Arvai and Froschauer 2010). The importance of 
outcomes to outside observes makes intuitive sense: Insofar as these individuals have little or no 
control over—or agency in—the decision-making process, whether decision is judged to be “good” or 
“bad” will depend upon whether people received what they expected or were promised. Applied to the 
question of balance between academic and industry scientists on a SAB, all that may really matter to 
outside observers is whether or not its decisions or recommendations conform with some expected or 
normative standard. 
In the remainder of this paper, we present and discuss the results from an experiment aimed at 
improving our understanding of how the composition of the EPA’s SAB is perceived by the public. 
Specifically, we were interested in the question of how SAB composition—namely the balance 
between academic and industry scientists—effects people’s satisfaction with, and their ratings of the 
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We presented a nationally representative sample of participants with hypothetical EPA SABs 
composed of varying proportions of academic and industry scientists. We then asked participants to 
rate their satisfaction with, and the legitimacy of decision-making processes employed by these 
boards in light of their recommendations in the context of two hypothetical scenarios based on actual 
EPA SAB deliberations about pesticides. One scenario focused on protecting environmental health 
and the other focused on safeguarding human health. 
Participants were asked to consider a recommendation from the SAB to either relax or strengthen an 
existing EPA rule about pesticide use. We relied largely on prior research on procedural justice as the 
entry point to hypothesis development. We, therefore, hypothesized that SABs dominated by industry 
scientists would be perceived to be more motivated to make decisions to protect business interests 
(H1) while SABs dominated by academic scientists would be perceived to be more motivated to make 
decisions to protect the interests of human (H2) and environmental health (H3). Finally, we 
hypothesized that participants would be more satisfied with more restrictive regulations (H4); we also 
hypothesized that advisory boards composed of a higher proportion of academic scientists (relative to 
industry scientists) would be viewed as making more legitimate recommendations (H5).  
2. Methods 
2.1 Participants 
Participants in this research were citizens of the United States over the age of 18 and were recruited 
from an online panel maintained by Dynata TM (formerly known as Survey Sampling International TM).  
We worked with Dynata TM because, at the time this research was conducted, they maintained their 
own large panel (with more than 3 million opt-in/first-party participants based in the U.S.); thus, we 
not confronted with the need to aggregate data from multiple panels as is often the case with other 
platforms (e.g., Qualtrics TM). Participants were randomly drawn from a probability sample of U.S.-
based panel members in the Dynata TM database (Table S1).  
For a desired sample of 2,400 participants, a total of 3,180 participants were initially recruited to 
participate in this study. A power analysis for our planned 3-way ANOVA, conducted using 
G*Power, suggested that we needed to recruit 1302 to participants to have 95% power to detect a 
small effect size of Cohen’s f = 0.1 at ⍺ = 0.05 (Faul et al. 2009). A total of 227 participants were 
removed from the dataset because they failed to complete the experiment. An additional 453 
participants were removed from the dataset for spending less than half of the median time (4.6 
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lining (i.e., no variation in responses) on the Likert scale questions. After data cleaning, the total 
sample size was reduced to 2,500. 
Overall, the sample was 56% female (n = 1,383) and 43% male (n = 1,082); a combined 1% of the 
sample (n = 29) self-identified as non-binary (n = 14), self-described their gender (n = 7), or preferred 
not to report it (n = 8). The average age of participants was 46 (SD = 15.5). The majority (60%) of 
participants attended some college (n = 1490); 21% (n = 527) of participants reported a high school 
education or lower and 19% (n = 477) reported an education level beyond a bachelor’s degree (Table 
S1). 
2.2 Experimental Design and Data Analysis 
The experiment utilized a 2 (board composition) ⨉ 2 (scenario) ⨉ 2 (recommendation) between-
subjects design. After obtaining informed consent
5
, participants read a short introduction to the EPA 
and its SAB, and then were randomly assigned to read about one of two 40-member board 
compositions: one was composed of 80% academic scientists and 20% industry scientists (i.e., 
academic-heavy), and the other was composed of 20% academic scientists and 80% industry scientists 
(i.e., industry-heavy); see the Supplemental Materials section (Table S2) for the specific wording of 
these scenarios. A pie chart depicting the ratio of academic scientists to industry scientists was 
included to help participants visualize these differences. 
Next, participants were randomly assigned to one of two EPA policy scenarios. In the first scenario, 
participants were told about an unnamed pesticide that kills insect pests, but that may also kill non-
pest insects such as pollinators (bees, butterflies) that are beneficial for environmental health. In the 
second scenario, participants read about the same unnamed pesticide; however, rather than being 
harmful to non-pest insects, participants were told that the chemical may cause cancer in humans.  
Participants were then randomly assigned to one of two different SAB recommendations. In one, the 
SAB recommended that the regulation of the pesticide be made more restrictive (e.g., allowing the 
pesticide to be used less frequently and at lower concentrations); in the second, the SAB 
recommended that the regulation of the pesticide be made less restrictive (e.g., allowing the pesticide 
to be used more frequently and at higher concentrations). 
                                                          
5This project was approved by the Health Sciences and Behavioral Sciences Institutional Review Board (protocol number 
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Participants were asked to indicate their perceptions of the assigned SAB’s underlying motivations: to 
support policies that promote business interests, to support policies that promote human health, and to 
support policies that promote the natural environment. These responses were collected on 7-point 
Likert scales from “not at all motivated” to “completely motivated”. Participants were also asked how 
satisfied they were with the SAB’s recommendation, on a 7-point Likert scale from “not at all 
satisfied” to “completely satisfied”.  
Next, participants were asked to provide ratings of the decision-making process employed by the SAB 
based on two criteria thought to be important aspects of procedural justice (per Tyler 2000): the 
SAB’s standing as a group of scientific experts and the SAB’s neutrality when it comes to the issues 
put before its members. To this end, participants were asked about the extent to which they thought 
the SAB made its recommendation based on the best available science (i.e., standing) and to what 
extent they trusted the SAB to make an unbiased recommendation (i.e., neutrality). Responses to both 
questions were collected on 7-point Likert scales from “not at all science-based” to “completely 
science-based” for the first question, and from “very low trust” to “very high trust” for the second 
question. Participants’ responses to these two items were highly correlated (r = 0.75, p < 0.001) so 
they were combined to form a single measure we termed “legitimacy” (Cronbach’s  = 0.86).  
We performed three-way analyses of variance to measure the effect of SAB composition, scenario, 
and recommendation on the dependent variables (satisfaction, underlying motivations, and 
legitimacy).  
3. Results 
3.1 Perceived motivation to protect business interests 
We did not observe a significant two- or three-way interaction between composition, scenario, and 
recommendation on judgments about a SAB’s motivation to protect business interests (Table I). 
Likewise, we did not detect a main effect of scenario on the perceived motivation to protect business 
interests. However, both recommendation and board composition exhibited significant main effects. 
Supporting H1, participants thought that protecting business interests was a stronger motive for the 
industry-heavy SAB (n = 1,263, = 4.55, SD = 1.92) than it was for the academic-heavy SAB (n = 
1,244, = 4.34, SD = 1.97). Participants also judged the motivation to protect business interests as 
greater when the SAB recommended a less restrictive regulation (n = 1,252, = 5.19, SD = 1.76) vs. 
when it recommended a more restrictive regulation (n = 1,255, = 3.70, SD = 1.83). 
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3.2 Perceived motivation to protect human health 
We observed a significant three-way interaction between board composition, scenario, and 
recommendation for judgments about the SAB’s motivation to protect human health (Table I, Figure 
1). Statistical significance was accepted at the Bonferroni corrected p < 0.025 level for simple two-
way interactions and simple-simple main effects. There was a statistically significant simple two-way 
interaction between board composition and recommendation for the environmental health scenario 
(F(1,2499) = 5.89, p = 0.015) but not the human health scenario (F(1,2499) = 1.32, p = 0.251).  
— Insert Figure 1 Here — 
Exploring this simple two-way interaction further, we observed a significant simple-simple main 
effect for the environmental health scenario in both the academic-heavy (F(1,2499) = 284.41, p < 0.001) 
and industry-heavy SAB conditions (F(1,2499) = 183.18, p < 0.001). Simple-simple pairwise 
comparisons were carried out for those in the environmental health scenario with an academic-heavy 
and industry-heavy SAB with a Bonferroni correction once again applied. The pattern was the same 
for both SAB compositions: participants perceived the SABs to be more motivated to protect human 
health (p < 0.001) when the SAB made a more restrictive recommendation (academic-heavy: = 
5.54, SD = 1.52; industry-heavy: = 5.28, SD = 1.62) than when it made a less restrictive 
recommendation (academic-heavy: = 3.12, SD = 1.97; industry-heavy: = 3.35, SD = 2.00). 
However, H2 was not supported as there was no significant difference in perceived motivation to 
protect human health between academic-heavy and industry-heavy SAB compositions (F(1,2499) = 1.45, 
p = 0.228). 
3.3 Perceived motivation to protect environmental health 
We did not observe any significant two- or three-way interactions between composition, scenario, and 
recommendation for judgments about the SAB’s motivation to protect environmental health (Table I). 
Significant main effects were observed for scenario and recommendation only. Participants thought 
the SAB was more motivated to protect environmental health when it issued a more restrictive (n = 
1,252, = 5.49, SD = 1.54) vs. less restrictive recommendation (n = 1,255, = 3.00, SD = 2.01). 
Participants also indicated that protecting environmental health was a more powerful motive within 
the environmental health context (n = 1,262, = 4.45, SD = 2.18) than the human health context (n = 
1,245, = 4.04, SD = 1.12). H3, predicting that perceived motivations to protect environmental health 
would differ by SAB composition, was not supported (F(1,2499) = 3.81, p = 0.051).  
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We did not detect any significant two- or three-way interactions between composition, scenario, and 
recommendation on participants’ satisfaction with the recommendation made by the SAB (Table II). 
Neither board composition nor scenario exhibited a main effect for participants’ satisfaction with the 
SAB’s recommendation. However, satisfaction was significantly different between the two 
recommendation types. Supporting H4, satisfaction was significantly higher for a more restrictive 
regulation (n = 1,252, = 5.70, SD = 1.62) vs. a less restrictive regulation (n = 1,255, = 2.74, SD = 
1.98). 
— Insert Table II Here — 
3.5 Perceived legitimacy 
We observed a significant three-way interaction between composition, scenario, and recommendation 
for participants’ judgments about the legitimacy of the process employed by the SAB (Table II, 
Figure 2). Specially, significant effects were observed at the Bonferroni corrected level of p < 0.025 
for simple two-way interactions and simple-simple main effects. We detected a significant simple 
two-way interaction between composition and recommendation in the environmental health scenario 
(F(1,2499) = 7.91, p = 0.005), but not the human health scenario (F(1,2499) = 0.05, p = 0.819).  
— Insert Figure 2 Here — 
Looking more closely at the simple two-way interaction, we observed a significant simple-simple 
main effect of environmental health scenario with an academic-heavy (F(1,2499) = 274.8, p < 0.001) and 
an industry-heavy SAB (F(1,2499) = 161.25, p < 0.001). However, H5 was unsupported as there was no 
significant difference in perceived legitimacy by board composition (F(1,2499) = 1.36, p = 0.243). 
Simple-simple pairwise comparisons were carried out for the environmental health scenario combined 
with an academic-heavy and industry-heavy SAB; a Bonferroni correction was once again applied. 
The perceived legitimacy of the academic-heavy SAB was significantly higher (p < 0.001) when it 
made a more restrictive recommendation ( = 5.25, SD = 1.37) compared to when it made a less 
restrictive recommendation ( = 3.18, SD = 1.69). The perceived legitimacy of the industry-heavy 
SAB was also significantly higher (p < 0.001) when it made a more restrictive recommendation ( = 
5.01, SD = 1.43) when compared to a less restrictive recommendation ( = 3.44, SD = 1.75).   
4. Discussion 
We examined public judgments about their satisfaction with, the motivations behind, and the 
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the EPA’s SAB) as a function of its composition (i.e., dominated by academic vs. industry scientists), 
the scenario it was addressing (i.e., human or environmental health), and the type of recommendation 
made (i.e., suggesting a less or more stringent regulation). 
We found that, independent of SAB composition and scenario, people demonstrated higher levels of 
satisfaction with more restrictive recommendations; this finding was in line with our hypothesis (H4). 
More restrictive recommendations also led people to believe that a SAB was strongly motivated to 
safeguard environmental health, and less motivated to protect the interests of businesses regardless of 
SAB composition; this finding did not support two of our hypotheses (H3 and H1). Similarly, people 
exposed to a SAB making a more restrictive recommendation believed it was more motivated to 
protect human health and judged the legitimacy of the decision-making process leading to the 
recommendation to be higher; these findings did not depend on SAB composition and, therefore, did 
not support our hypothesis (H2 and H5). Unsurprisingly, participants exposed to an industry-heavy 
SAB judged it to be more strongly motivated to protect business interests when compared to an 
academic-heavy SAB; this finding was in line with our hypothesis (H1). 
Consistent with research on procedural justice (McComas et al. 2007), we hypothesized that an 
advisory body composed mainly of academic scientists—vs. industry scientists who are more often 
perceived as having conflicts of interest (Besley et al. 2017)—would be perceived as making more 
legitimate recommendations (i.e., recommendations that were perceived to be unbiased and science-
based). However, our results suggest that board composition is not the determining factor in 
judgments about legitimacy. Rather, it was the stringency of the SAB’s recommendation that 
determined legitimacy in this study; recommendations by a SAB for more stringent regulations were 
viewed as more legitimate when compared to recommendations that regulations be less stringent. 
Similarly, SAB composition was not related to participants’ satisfaction; once again, 
recommendations by a SAB for more (vs. less) stringent regulations were met with higher levels of 
participant satisfaction. 
One of the reviewers of this paper pointed out that the mechanism underlying this result may be that 
respondents did not understand the difference between academic scientists and industry scientists. 
This is possible, but given the clear differences in perceptions of academic and industry scientists 
observed in other studies (e.g., Besley et al. 2017), and because academic and industry scientists were 
clearly differentiated in the experiment’s preamble (see the Supplemental Materials section), we 
believe that this would not have been the case here. Alternatively, participants may have believed that 
academic scientists are just as conflicted (e.g., in terms of their financial or research ties to 
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(and receive compensation from) regulated industries to assist with research and development; 
likewise, they may lead research efforts, or are quite likely to be employed by universities that are 
funded (in part) by grants from industry. We did not ask participants rate their perceptions of conflict 
of interest as they relate to academic vs. industry scientists; thus, we are unable to test for this 
possibility. We intend to address this question in a future study. 
It is also noteworthy from our results that people judged both academic- and industry-heavy SABs as 
equally motivated to protect human and environmental health. As we note above, these results ran 
contrary to our hypothesis. SAB composition had a significant main effect only when participants 
were asked to evaluate the SABs motivation to protect business interests; specifically, a SAB with a 
high proportion of industry scientists was judged by participants to be more motivated to protect 
business interests. 
These results are surprising on two levels. On the one hand, they unfold in sharp contrast to the 
concerns raised by academic scientists and members of the general public about the inclusion of more 
industry scientists on federal science advisory boards (such as the EPA’s Chartered SAB). In spite of 
recent criticism of the EPA for terminating the service of academic scientists and replacing them with 
more industry scientists (e.g., see Malakoff 2017, Tonko 2017, Boyle and Kotchen 2018), members of 
the public don’t seem to see these changes as problematic from the standpoint of their satisfaction 
with a SAB or the legitimacy of its recommendations. On the other hand, these results suggest that the 
public’s expectation is that advisory bodies—the EPA’s Chartered SAB in this study—will protect 
human and environmental health when they are at risk. That these expectations are prevalent even 
when a SAB dominated by industry scientists is seen as being motivated to protect business interests 
is important because it implies that the objectives of a committee’s work—namely to protect people 
and the environment from risk—ought to trump the committee’s underlying ideology (e.g., to promote 
a free market).  
However, there is an alternative explanation for our results, which is that participants in this study are 
basing their judgments about satisfaction, underlying motivations, and legitimacy on their negative or 
positive perceptions of the SAB’s recommendation. Specifically, these findings are also consistent 
with prior experimental work (Baron and Hershey 1988, Lipshitz and Barak 1995, Arvai and 
Froschauer 2010) that demonstrated that people judged the quality of decision-making processes (and 
their satisfaction with those who made them) as either positive or negative based on the whether the 
outcomes resulting from them were either positive or negative. Here, decisions were coded as “good” 
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Thus, participants in the research reported here may have been willing to abandon any preconceived 
notions about SAB bias when the board made a recommendation in the direction of more restrictive 
regulation. In this sense, the halo effect (Thorndike 1920) associated with a more or less stringent risk 
management recommendation may be “spilling over” to influence participants’ judgments about other 
attributes of a SAB (e.g., satisfaction and legitimacy). 
Taken together, our results suggest that people may be relying on desirable outcomes as a heuristic for 
assessing the legitimacy of, and their satisfaction with a SAB. Prior research (van den Bos et al. 1997, 
van den Bos and Miedema 2000) suggests that people rely on judgments about procedural fairness as 
a means of evaluating an outcome when the degree of “goodness” or “badness” associated with it is 
ambiguous.  In the case of the study reported here, the reverse appears to also be true. Research on 
people acting as jurors in legal matters (Skitka and Houston 2001) supports this suggestion; it shows 
that normative positions—what the authors termed “moral mandates” such as punishing the guilty—
act as determinants of how people make judgments about process.  
Applied to the research reported in this paper, the normative response to a pesticide that poses an 
unacceptable risk to either environmental or human health is to regulate it more stringently, even if 
would be advantageous to the financial bottom line of companies to relax the rules governing its use. 
This perspective aligns with the growing number of Americans—63% in 2019, which is up from 59% 
in 2017—who believe that stricter environmental regulations are “worth the cost” (Pew Research 
Center 2019). It stands to reason, therefore, that any (academic-heavy or industry-heavy) SAB that 
takes such an action will be rewarded with positive ratings of both satisfaction with and legitimacy.  
From a practical perspective, the results from this research suggest that members of the public are 
supportive of science advisory boards regardless of their composition, but only if they take actions 
(e.g., make risk management recommendations) that are consistent with normative expectations about 
either the board’s mandate, or the target of their deliberations. This presents both good news and bad 
news from the standpoint of the EPA’s recent agency directive aimed at, the agency’s words, 
“ensuring the integrity” of the EPA’s chartered SAB. 
It is good news because people seem willing to accept SAB compositions that alter the historic 
balance that strongly favored academic scientists in the direction of greater representation by 
scientists from regulated industry. However, it is bad news if one accepts the criticisms leveled 
against the EPA that the ulterior motive of this directive is to weaken regulations that safeguard 
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that uphold normative standards exemplified by the mission of the agency that they serve. In the case 
of the EPA, it is to protect environmental and human health. 
The research reported here was not without limitations which, taken together, open the door to future 
studies. Our study design did not provide information about hypothetical SAB members or their 
qualifications. This is an important omission because not all scientists—whether they work for 
industry or in the academy—are equal in terms of their qualifications and motivations. As of this 
writing, for example, some members of the current iteration of the EPA’s Chartered SAB are climate 
change skeptics, while others are known for their previous efforts aimed at rolling back human and 
environmental health safeguards. We intentionally withheld information about the qualifications and 
past work of individual SAB members so that we may better understand participant perceptions of 
SAB composition as a whole. However, members of the public have access to information about 
individual SAB members, and this may strongly influence their perceptions in a real-world setting.  
We also limited both the number and types of scenarios shown to participants. Future studies could 
consider a broader range of scenarios where the normatively “correct” recommendation is less clear to 
participants. Results from our research lead us to believe that SABs that acted to protect human and 
environmental health were rewarded with more positive ratings of satisfaction and legitimacy. In the 
absence of a normatively correct recommendation, participants would be required to look more 
closely at other contextual cues—such as board composition or member qualifications—to evaluate 
these variables. This in turn would add important detail to our understanding of how members of the 
public feel about changes to federal SABs like those enacted by the EPA.  
In spite of these limitations, our research sheds light on the importance of the activities and the 
recommendations of SABs as variables that influence the public’s ratings of satisfaction and 
legitimacy. Our research is both important and timely because it demonstrates that SAB composition 
may not be as important as SAB behavior. Science advisory boards, such as the EPA’s Chartered 
SAB, are assembled to offer science-based advice to policy-makers in a manner that is consistent with 
an agency’s mission and mandate. Changing the rules by which SABs are structured to either satisfy a 
fleeting political agenda, or as a vehicle for enacting regulatory rollbacks, is likely to be met with 
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Table I. Three-way ANOVA for perceived motivation to protect business interests, human health, 
and environmental health as a function of board composition, scenario, and recommendation. 
 
  Motivation: Business Motivation: Human Health Motivation: Environment 








 Board composition (C) 4.77 .029 .002 1.45 .228 .001 3.81 .051 .002 
Scenario (S) 0.34 .563 .000 3.16 .075 .001 12.08 .001 .005 











 C ⨉ S 0.08 .780 .000 1.07 .300 .000 0.23 .629 .000 
C ⨉ R 0.58 .447 .000 0.81 .370 .000 1.80 .180 .001 
S ⨉ R 0.01 .915 .000 15.63 <.001 .006 3.42 .064 .001 
C ⨉ S ⨉ R 2.14 .144 .001 6.38 .012 .003 2.83 .092 .001 













Table II. Three-way ANOVAs for participant satisfaction with the SAB’s recommendation and 
perceived legitimacy as a function of board composition, scenario, and recommendation.  
 
  Satisfaction Legitimacy 








 Board composition (C) 3.10 .078 .001 1.36 .243 .001 
Scenario (S) 3.14 .076 .001 1.66 .198 .001 











 C ⨉ S 0.37 .545 .000 1.96 .162 .001 
C ⨉ R 0.01 .946 .000 3.32 .069 .001 
S ⨉ R 0.20 .652 .000 0.60 .439 .000 
C ⨉ S ⨉ R 1.38 .241 .001 4.60 .032 .002 












Figure 1. Estimated marginal means of the extent to which the SAB was perceived to be motivated to 
protect human health as a function of board composition, scenario, and recommendation. The solid 
line represents the academic-heavy SAB and the hatched line represents the industry-heavy SAB. For 










Figure 2. Estimated marginal means of the perception that the SAB made a legitimate decision as a 
function of board composition, scenario, and recommendation. The solid line represents the academic-
heavy SAB and the hatched line represents the industry-heavy SAB. For the non-significant three-way 
interactions, see Figures S1 to S3.  
